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Human randomness perception is commonly described as biased. This is because when generating
random sequences humans tend to systematically under- and overrepresent certain subsequences relative
to the number expected from an unbiased random process. In a purely theoretical analysis we have
previously suggested that common misperceptions of randomness may actually reflect genuine aspects of
the statistical environment, once cognitive constraints are taken into account which impact on how that
environment is actually experienced (Hahn & Warren, Psychological Review, 2009). In the present study
we undertake an empirical test of this account, comparing human-generated against unbiased process-
generated binary sequences in two experiments. We suggest that comparing human and theoretically
unbiased sequences using metrics reflecting the constraints imposed on human experience provides a
more meaningful picture of lay people’s ability to perceive randomness. Finally, we propose a simple
generative model of human random sequence generation inspired by the Hahn and Warren account.
Taken together our results question the notion of bias in human randomness perception.
Public Significance Statement
The dominant perspective in experimental psychology is that human judgment and decision making
are flawed. This is particularly evident in research on human perception of randomness. Here we
explore this idea, presenting several analyses of data from an experiment in which participants are
asked to generate a sequence of outcomes from a binary random process (like a coin toss). Although
behavior does depart from the output of genuinely random source, the extent of this departure
depends on how performance is characterized and whether constraints on human memory and
attention span are taken into account. We find that when such constraints are considered, and
appropriate performance measures are used, humans actually match the random source rather well.
We argue more generally it may be problematic to emphasize errors in human judgment and
decision-making without taking account of appropriate constraints.
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Randomness is the flip side of statistical structure. Conse-
quently, researchers interested in human beings as “intuitive
statisticians” have long been interested in people’s ability to
identify patterns of data as random. A long tradition of research
has reached rather negative conclusions about people’s intuitive
understanding of randomness. Whereas early studies focused
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primarily on people’s ability to generate random sequences
(see, e.g., Wagenaar, 1972), later work has also examined
people’s ability to judge sequences as random (see, e.g., Bar-
Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; and see
Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland, & Hastie, 2009 for an
extensive review).
Both studies of sequence generation and production have found
evidence of similar biases, in particular a bias toward overalterna-
tion between the different possible outcomes, such as “heads” (H)
or “tails” (T), in binary sequences. This alternation bias has fre-
quently been interpreted as evidence for a belief in the “gambler’s
fallacy” (GF), that is, the erroneous belief that an increasing run of
one outcome (e.g., HHHHHH . . .) makes the other outcome ever
more likely (but see, e.g., Edwards, 1961).1 Such a belief, which
can indeed be found among gamblers around the world (Clotfelter
& Cook, 1993; Croson & Sundali, 2005; Terrell, 1998; Toneatto,
Blitz-Mille, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997), may reflect
a mistaken conception of random processes as “self-correcting” in
such a way as to maintain an equal balance between the possible
outcomes (for other explanations see, e.g., the review of research
on the GF by Hahn, 2011).
However, the concept of randomness is a difficult, and often
counterintuitive, one not just for gamblers or experimental partic-
ipants, but also for experimenters (on the concept of randomness
see, e.g., Beltrami, 1999), and extensive critiques have shown
much of the empirical research on lay understanding of random-
ness to be conceptually flawed (see in particular, Ayton, Hunt, &
Wright, 1989; Nickerson, 2002; but also Lopes, 1982). Aforemen-
tioned evidence from real-world gamblers aside, it is less clear
than might be expected how good or bad lay people’s ability to
both discern and mimic the output of random sources actually is.
Research with novel tasks, that do not suffer from the concep-
tual flaws identified, have tended to confirm some element of bias
in people’s performance (e.g., Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2008;
Rapoport & Budescu, 1992) while finding also that participants’
performance is considerably better than deemed by past research
(see, e.g., Lopes & Oden, 1987; Nickerson & Butler, 2009).
In particular, it has been argued that people’s performance may
actually be quite good given their actual experience of random
sequences, whether inside or outside the lab. Williams and Grif-
fiths (2013) show how seemingly poor performance on random-
ness judgment tasks may stem from the genuine paucity of the
available statistical evidence. Hahn and Warren (2009) similarly
argue that common biases and misperceptions of randomness may
actually reflect genuine aspects of the statistical environment, once
it is taken into account how that environment is actually experi-
enced. Specifically, Hahn and Warren demonstrate that if human
experience of a stream of binary random events is assumed to be
(a) finite and (b) constrained by the limitations of short-term
memory (STM) and/or attention, then based upon highly counter-
intuitive mathematical results, not all binary substrings are equally
likely to occur.
We next describe this theoretical account in more detail, before
going on to present the results of two behavioral experiments that
provide evidence that human perception of randomness conforms
to the theoretical treatment outlined. Finally, we present a simple
generative model of human random sequence generation that re-
flects key features of the Hahn and Warren account.
Hahn and Warren (2009) Account of
Randomness Perception
The theoretical account of randomness perception in Hahn and
Warren (2009, 2010) relies upon a simple model of how a human
might experience an unfolding sequence of random events. It is
proposed that humans have a limited capacity window of experi-
ence of length k that has access to the present event and preceding
k-1 events. This window slides one event at a time through an
unfolding finite sequence of length n k. That humans could only
ever experience a finite stream of events is incontrovertible. Fur-
ther, given the well-characterized bounds on human STM capacity
and/or attention span, this limited capacity, sliding window of
experience account seems plausible.
Crucially, when subsequences of length k are counted among a
longer finite sequence of length n using the sliding window anal-
ysis suggested above, certain subsequences are more likely to not
occur, even when the generation process is unbiased. In particular
perfect runs of one outcome have highest nonoccurrence proba-
bility (or conversely lowest occurrence rate), followed by perfect
alternations of the two outcomes. This highly counterintuitive
mathematical result is illustrated in Figure 1B; the unbroken line
represents the occurrence rates for the 16 possible subsequences of
length 4. For example, the occurrence rate for the perfect run
subsequence 0000 is around 0.47 meaning that this subsequence
does not appear at all on around 53% of all sequences of length 20
generated by an unbiased random process. In contrast the occur-
rence rate for subsequence 0001 is around 0.75 meaning that this
subsequence does not appear on only around 25% of unbiased
sequences of length 20. Hahn and Warren (2009) argue that if
human experience of unfolding random events mimics the sliding
window, then this could explain three key tendencies of human
randomness perception that are taken as evidence of bias:
1. A tendency to think that sequences with some irregularity
are more likely given an unbiased coin.
2. An expectation of equal numbers of heads and tails
within a sequence.
3. A tendency to overalternate between outcomes when
generating random sequences.
Based on theoretical data of the kind presented here (Figure 1B
unbroken line), Hahn and Warren argue that (a) is reasonable, that
is, the figure demonstrates that there is statistical support for the
intuition that regular subsequences (e.g., 1111, 0101) occur less
often than irregular subsequences (e.g., 0100, 1101). Hahn and
Warren also argue that (b) is consistent with the sliding window
account because it is difficult to distinguish between the vast
majority of sequences using occurrence rate (Figure 1B, unbroken
line) suggesting judgments should be based not on an explicit
coding of each subsequence but something simpler such as the
1 Human participants are prone to overalternation (assumed to be indicative
of the gambler’s fallacy) in both the perception and generation of sequences
that involve mechanical random devices, such as coins or roulette wheels.
They also seem to attribute less alternation than may be empirically justified in
the context of fluctuating human performance, displaying the so-called ‘hot
hand fallacy’ (see e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2005).
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proportion of heads. Finally, Hahn and Warren argue (c) follows
directly from the sliding window account because short sequences
tend to have more alternations between outcomes than expected in
an infinite series (Kareev, 1992).
Overview
In the present study we examine the characteristics of human
randomness perception in light of the theoretical account of
Hahn and Warren (2009) across two experiments. Although a
range of tasks have been used previously to investigate ran-
domness perception, sequence generation has been by far the
most dominant and, accordingly, we use this task in both our
experiments. In Experiment 1 we asked participants to first
observe the output of a random source before generating a
random binary sequence. In Experiment 2 we replicated Exper-
iment 1 but also examined the effect of recent experience by
comparing sequences generated both before and after exposure
to the random source. To preempt our results, in both experi-
ments we find that when compared on expected frequency of
occurrence of binary subsequences, behavior departs markedly
from that of an unbiased random generating process. This is a
common finding in the literature and such results give rise to
the notion of bias in randomness perception, since for an
unbiased random process the expected frequencies should all be
equal for any specified subsequence length. However, we also
show that human sequences are remarkably similar to those of
an unbiased random generation process when other methods of
comparison are used that are relevant to the sliding window
account (e.g., subsequence occurrence rate or direct comparison
of subsequence frequency distributions for a given window
length), and that this is particularly evident at subsequence
lengths around 4. This is a plausible length of the typical human
window of experience as defined above and in line with re-
search suggesting that the effective span of STM is 4 when
Figure 1. (A) Results of Analysis 1 for sliding window length 4. Average subsequence frequencies per 20-bit
block are presented for both human-generated (dots) and the theoretically unbiased (TU) data (solid line, 95%
confidence interval [CI] dashed lines). (B) The results of Analysis 2 for sliding window length 4. Proportions
of 20-bit blocks containing at least one occurrence of the subsequence are presented for both human-generated
(dots) and TU data (solid line, 95% CI dashed lines).
665“BIAS” IN HUMAN RANDOMNESS PERCEPTION
strategies such as rehearsal are ruled out (Cowan, 2001, 2010).
Finally, we present a simple model of binary sequence gener-
ation in humans that incorporates the key features of the Hahn
and Warren (2009) account. This model generates binary out-
comes with one free parameter, reflecting the extent to which
the probability of runs of the same outcome (e.g., 111...1) is
down-weighted to favor sequences in which the run is ended
(e.g., 111...0).
Experiment 1
Participants first observed blocks of binary outcome random
sequences following an unbiased Bernoulli process (p  .5) and
were then instructed to generate random outputs to match the
properties of the observed process.
Method
Participants. Twelve undergraduate students from the Uni-
versity of Manchester participated on a voluntary basis and gave
informed consent. Participants received course credit as payment.
There were no exclusion criteria.
Materials. Participants were seated in front of a 19-inch LCD
display. The experimental stimuli were presented using the Python
programming language on a PC running Windows 7. Participants
responded using a standard Windows keyboard.
Procedure. Participants were told they would first observe the
output of a machine generating a random sequence of 1’s and 0’s,
and that they should attend to it (Presentation Phase) before going
on to generate a sequence (Generation Phase).
Presentation Phase: Each digit (a 1 or 0) appeared on the screen
for 250 ms before being replaced by the next digit in the sequence.
The display of each digit was accompanied by a corresponding
tone. The display was full screen with a black background. The
digits were displayed in white in 80 point Arial font in the center
of the screen. To reinforce the signal provided by the random
source 1’s were accompanied by a high (1200 Hz) tone, and 0’s by
a low (800 Hz) tone.2 After every 20 digits the sequence paused
and participants were required to complete a distractor task. The
distractor task consisted of counting the number of vowels in a list
of 10 words. In total participants observed 600 digits over 30
blocks of length 20.
Generation Phase: Participants were asked to generate a new
sequence representative of the one they had just observed in the
Presentation Phase. They used the keyboard to press either 1 with
their left hand, or 0 with their right hand. For each key press
participants saw the appropriate digit on screen and heard the
corresponding tone, exactly as in the presentation phase. As in the
Presentation Phase, participants generated 600 digits in 30 blocks
of 20 and the same distractor task was used in between each block.
Data analysis. We compared the statistical properties of se-
quences generated by a truly random Bernoulli process (p  .5)
and those generated by our participants (N  12). Based on
evidence that the effective span of short term memory is 4 items,
when strategies such as rehearsal are ruled out (Cowan, 2001,
2010), we describe our analysis, and present results for k 4 only.
However, we have repeated our preliminary analyses for other
values k  3 to k  6 (see supplemental materials). For each
participant, and each of the 30 blocks of data collected, we slid a
window of length k  4 through the 20-bit sequence of generated
outcomes. We then undertook four analyses of these sequences by
aggregating data across observers. From 12 participants generating
30  20-bit sequences we had 360 sequences over which to assess
performance. We undertook the following four analyses to char-
acterize performance in different ways.
Analysis 1: We calculated the average observed frequency for
each of the 16 possible subsequences per 20-bit sequence. Note
that for an unbiased random process the expected frequency of
each subsequence should be 1.0625 per 20-bit sequence. When
randomness perception is referred to as biased, it is typically based
on the observation that participant generated subsequences do not
occur with equal frequency (e.g., alternating sequences are over-
represented and runs are underrepresented).
Analysis 2: We calculated the occurrence rate— that is, the
proportion of 20-bit sequences that contained at least one occur-
rence of each of the 16 possible subsequences. Note this metric is
the complement of the nonoccurrence probability described by
Hahn and Warren (2009). Even for an unbiased random process
this metric will not be the same for all subsequences (see Hahn &
Warren, 2009 and Figure 1B).
Analysis 3: We generated histograms illustrating the proportion
of 20-bit sequences containing 0, 1, 2, and so forth . . . occurrences
of three subsequences AAAA, ABAB, AAAB (averaged over A
1, B  0 cases and vice versa) that are particularly interesting
under the Hahn and Warren (2009) account. Subsequence 0000
(and its complement 1111) has special status since its nonoccur-
rence rate for plausible values of n and k is markedly different
from the other sequences. Similarly, subsequence 0101 (and its
complement 1010) is interesting because its nonoccurrence rate is
lower than the other sequences. Subsequence 0001 (and its com-
plement 1110) is interesting when compared to a perfect run of the
same length. This comparison is relevant to the gambler’s fallacy
phenomenon. Note that Analysis 1 is equivalent to calculating the
expected value of such distributions for each of the 16 subse-
quences.
Analysis 4: The histograms generated in Analysis 3 contain
significant positive skew. Consequently we generated boxplots
illustrating the median, Inter-Quartile Range (IQR) and extreme
data for the distributions obtained in Analysis 3.
We also generated the same amount of data (360  20-bit
sequences) as that obtained from human participants from a gen-
uinely unbiased Bernoulli process (p  .5). We refer to these
simulated sequences as the theoretically unbiased (TU) data-set
and their properties are analyzed in an identical manner to the
human data. By repeatedly generating (N  1,000) TU data-sets
we were able to place confidence bounds on the metrics described
in Analysis 1 and 2 for a TU participant.
Results
In Figure 1A the dots represent the observed expected values of
human-generated subsequence frequencies (Analysis 1) at window
length 4. The unbroken black lines represent the equivalent metric
for the TU participant. The dashed lines represent the 95% confi-
dence interval (CI) on the TU data. Note that the TU expected
2 In Experiment 2 we investigate the impact of the auditory stimulus
over and above the visual stimulus.
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frequencies are the same across subsequences since in an unbiased
random process all subsequences at all window lengths should be
equally represented (e.g., see Beltrami, 1999). Although the ma-
jority of the human data lies within the CI for the TU data, there
are some clear departures and there appears to be systematic over-
and underrepresentation of certain subsequences relative to the TU
data. This analysis illustrates the standard description of human
random sequence generation as biased. Relative to the TU data, the
perfect runs are clearly underrepresented and 10 of the other 14
subsequences are overrepresented.
Figure 1B shows the outcome of Analysis 2 for window length
4. The dots represent the occurrence rate—that is, the proportion of
the 360 blocks on which a subsequence occurred at least once—for
human participants. Respectively, the solid black and dashed lines
illustrate the equivalent occurrence rate and 95% CI for the TU
data. Using this analysis the human and TU data share several
common features, including a marked decrease in occurrence rate
for perfect runs. In addition the human data appear to follow the
fluctuations in the TU data with high correlation between the
sequence occurrence rates (r  .971).
We also undertook a follow-up analysis to further investigate
the high correlation observed in Figure 2B. In particular, one might
want to ask how remarkable it is to find such a high correlation and
what degree of correlation might arise by mathematical necessity
for any process that even crudely matches the properties of a
genuinely random source. In other words, how closely does a
generating source need to match a random process to give rise to
the degree of distributional match observed in our data.
A simple thought experiment illustrates the issue. A truly ran-
dom source has an expected long-term alternation rate of .5. This
alternation rate could be matched perfectly by generating a se-
quence of perfectly alternating 0s and 1s (i.e., 0101010101 . . .).
Though this sequence would match several of the statistical prop-
erties of sequences produced by random generating sources, it
would fail to match the subsequence distribution statistics shown
in Figure 1A and 1B.
In further analysis we examined the extent to which a random
generating source would need to be perturbed away from unbiased
to observe a marked drop in correlation in occurrence rates with
those of a truly random process. We reasoned that if that correla-
tion remains high over a large range of perturbations then the high
correlation observed in our observers seems unremarkable. How-
ever, if the correlation is sensitive to small perturbations then it
seems reasonable to suggest that the high correlation is because of
genuine similarity between human observers and a random process
and worthy of note. We perturbed the unbiased process in two
ways:
1. By manipulating the base rate , that is, the propensity of
the source to generate 0’s and 1’s. Specifically, we
changed the probability P(0)   of generating a 0 on
each step, and accordingly the probability P(1)  1- of
generating a 1 on each step. Clearly for an unbiased
random process   0.5. Increasing  above 0.5 leads to
a bias toward producing 0’s whereas decreasing the pa-
rameter leads to a bias for 1’s.
2. By manipulating the switching rate  of a Markov pro-
cess, that is, the propensity of the source to transition
from one possible state (0 or 1) at step i to the other state
at step i  1. Specifically, we defined a 2  2 Markov
transition matrix M with diagonal entries reflecting the
probability of sticking in the same state (0 or 1) set to 1-
and off diagonal entries, reflecting the probability of
switching (from 0 to 1 or vice versa) set to . For an
unbiased random process   0.5. Increasing  above
0.5 leads to a bias toward switching whereas decreasing
the parameter leads to a tendency to generate runs of the
same outcome.
The 95% CIs for the correlation between the biased and unbi-
ased generators as a function of the  and  parameters are shown
in Figure 2. Clearly the correlation coefficient obtained between
the occurrence rates at window length four is rather sensitive to
small perturbations away from a truly random process for both
perturbation types. Therefore, we conclude that the degree of
subsequence match observed in our data genuinely speaks to the
Figure 2. The results of the follow up analysis to examine degrees of correlation between occurrence rates of
the observed human generated and theoretically unbiased (TU) subsequences (k  4). (A) Variation in
correlation between occurrence rates of an unbiased process and those that are biased in base rate (). (B)
Variation in correlation between occurrence rates of an unbiased process and those that are biased in Markov
switching rate ().
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degree of appreciation participants show for the characteristic
outputs of random generating sources.
As noted in Hahn and Warren (2010), although the nonoccur-
rence probability, or its complement the occurrence rate, is a
convenient statistic with which to illustrate differences between
subsequences it is not the only statistic for which differences
emerge for an unbiased random process. In Analyses 3 and 4 we
illustrate significant differences between the distributions, medians
and modes of three key subsequence types: AAAA (i.e., 1111 and
0000), AAAB (i.e., 1110 and 0001), and ABAB (i.e., 1010 and
0101) and show that based on these analyses human and TU data
are in close agreement. In Figure 3 we present the outcome of
Analysis 3 for the TU (Figure 3A) and human (Figure 3B) data.
Note, that occurrence rates obtained in Analysis 2 for the three
subsequences considered can also be seen in Figure 3 as the sum
of all columns except that for frequency 0. Although there are
some differences in the human versus TU distributions they are
primarily both qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Further-
more, the clear skew in the distributions of these data suggests that
it might be problematic to use the expected value (i.e., the average
number of occurrences calculated in Analysis 1) as a summary
statistic. To reinforce this point note that the observed expected
values of the three distributions in Figure 3B are given by the
corresponding data points in Figure 1A. As noted in Analysis 1, for
the human data these expected values are different. On the other
hand for the TU data the expected values of the three distributions
in Figure 3A are identical at 1.0625. However, considering the
distributions, we see that the differences between human and TU
data are actually rather subtle. For example, for the AAAA se-
quences, even though the expected value is considerably lower for
human participants (around 0.7) than for the TU data distribution
(1.0625) this discrepancy appears to be largely driven by the fact
that high frequency sequences (e.g., beyond frequency 5) are
underrepresented in the human data. These extreme values would
contribute significantly to increasing the expected value even
though they are highly unlikely to be experienced. As a conse-
quence, we suggest that placing emphasis on the difference in
expected values between human data and that generated by a TU
process is problematic when there are similarities in the data
generated on other (potentially more appropriate) statistics.
In Figure 4 we present another illustration of the data in Figure
3. These boxplots emphasize the similarity in the median fre-
quency for the humans and TU data. In addition, box plots for the
AAAB and ABAB subsequences are very similar between human
and TU participants. Similar to Figure 3, for subsequence AAAA
the increased tendency for the TU participant to generate high
frequency sequences is also evident. As noted above, this tendency
is responsible for the higher expected value for TU relative to
human data. In addition we see that for an agent paying attention
to the median statistic it would be true to say that subsequence
Figure 3. The results of Analysis 3 for sliding window length 4. Histograms describe the proportion of blocks
containing each occurrence frequency for three selected subsequences. (A) theoretically unbiased (TU) data
truncated at occurrence frequency  6. Note the expected values of these three distributions are identical at
1.0625 (consistent with Analysis 1). (B) Data for human observers. Note that the expected values of these three
distributions are different from 1.0625 and equal to the appropriate average frequency data points in Figure 1A.
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AAAB is less likely to occur that AAAA. It is possible that this
plays a role in the gambler’s fallacy.
Note that although we have focused exclusively on the analyses
at window length k  4 we have data for lengths from k  3–6.
We find that up to length 5 there is good correspondence between
human and simulated data on Analyses 2, 3, and 4 but beyond this
value the discrepancies are greatly increased3 (see supplemental
materials for these analyses).
Discussion
In this experiment we have provided preliminary evidence in
line with the Hahn and Warren (2009) account of randomness
perception. We showed that sequences generated by human par-
ticipants were remarkably similar to those from a truly random
process when compared on a set of metrics that are more appro-
priate given the constraints on how humans might actually expe-
rience random events.
One potential issue with this study is that we used a relatively
small sample of participants. Arguably this makes our result even
more surprising—we did not need large amounts of data to find
similarities between our account and human data. However, it
would be useful to replicate our results in a larger sample.
Furthermore, it is possible that the data generated by our par-
ticipants after seeing a random source says more about ability of
participants to mimic rather than their concept of randomness. To
a certain extent this contention can be ruled out by showing that
participant generated sequences are not well matched to the actual
sequence observed. However, it would of course be more compel-
ling to measure participants’ sequence generation behavior both
before and after the random source experience. We will then be
able to assess the extent to which participants’ perception of
randomness was altered by that experience. If participants’ perfor-
mance is altered by passively viewing a “machine generating a
random sequence,” without any need to engage with the sequence
(e.g., through outcome prediction as in Edwards, 1961), it would
suggest both that experience of randomness is key, and that,
consequently, the much bemoaned “biases” in randomness percep-
tion and generation are ultimately transient phenomena. This will
be particularly compelling if the specific experience observed is
not as well matched to human performance since this would
suggest that participants have learned something general about
random sequences rather than how to mimic a specific sequence.
To investigate these issues we conducted a second experiment.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was very similar to Experiment 1 with the fol-
lowing changes. We used ‘H’ and ‘T’ with the cover story of a fair
coin, rather than ‘1’ and ‘0’, and whether or not participants heard
a sound accompanying the visual stimuli was manipulated as a
between subjects condition. The second difference was that par-
ticipants were asked to generate a random sequence before being
exposed to one. In the first experiment participants observed and
then generated, in the second experiment participants generated,
then observed, and then generated again. Experiment 2, therefore,
allowed us to test for any learning that might occur from being
exposed to a genuine random sequence. In all other respects
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Seventy-two participants from Birkbeck Col-
lege, University of London were recruited and gave informed
consent. Participants received £7.20 per hour as payment for their
time. Participants had a mean age of 29 (SD  11). There were 47
female participants and 25 male. There were no exclusion criteria.
Procedure. Participants first completed a generation task in
which they were asked to produce a sequence representative of
flipping a fair coin. Following the initial generation phase the
3 Placing emphasis on data beyond k  5 is problematic for other reasons.
Note that the number of subsequences to consider is doubled for each incre-
ment in k. As a consequence the amount of data we have available for each
subsequence is reduced. Perhaps more importantly, the amount of data that
would be required for a human to reliably discriminate and/or obtain useful
summary statistics for k  5 subsequences would be huge (see Hahn &
Warren, 2009).
Figure 4. The results of Analysis 4 for sliding window length 4. Boxplots illustrating medians Inter-Quartile
Range (IQRs) and extreme values of the data illustrated in Figure 2 for three selected sequences. (A) theoretically
unbiased (TU) data (truncated at frequency  12). (B) Data for human observers.
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experiment proceeded as in Experiment 1 with an observation and
then generation phase. To investigate the possible moderating
effects of the sounds used in Experiment 1, half of the participants
in Experiment 2 did not hear an accompanying sound.
Analyses. From 72 participants generating 30  20-bit se-
quences we had 2,160 sequences per condition over which to
assess performance. We conducted the same analyses as in Exper-
iment 1 with the addition of a mixed 2  2 analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to investigate the within subjects effects of generation
period (pre, post), and the between subjects effect of an accom-
panying sound (silent, tones). The dependent variable was the Root
Mean Square Error (RMSE) for the occurrence rate of each of the
possible length-four subsequences and the expected occurrence
rate under the Hahn and Warren account (analysis 2 in Experiment
1).
Results
Replication of analyses from Experiment 1. Average fre-
quencies of each subsequence per 20-bit long generated sequence
are shown in Figure 5.
Broadly speaking the data in Figure 5 are consistent with those
presented in Figure 1A in that there are clear departures in aver-
age frequency from those expected from the TU data. Note that the
data are similar irrespective of the tones condition but average
frequencies appear closer to those of the TU data in the post
condition.
Figure 6 shows the occurrence rate for each subsequence per
20-bit long generated sequence in the four conditions of Experi-
ment 2. Similar to the data in Figure 5, there is limited evidence of
an effect of the tones factor on performance. Once again the data
are in line with the results of Experiment 1. Consistent with the
data from Experiment 1 in Figure 1B, when analyzed based on the
occurrence rate metric the human and TU data are remarkably
similar. This is particularly the case in the post conditions, sug-
gesting that experience of a random source has lead to human
sequence generation that is closer to the TU data.
Figure 7 shows histograms of the proportion of times a 20-bit
long sequence contained 0, 1, 2,.. occurrences for the three sub-
sequences AAAA (i.e., 1111 and 0000), AAAB (i.e., 1110 and
0001), and ABAB (i.e., 1010 and 0101). The data are again similar
to those obtained in analysis 3 of the data from Experiment 1 (see
Figure 3). Note that as with Figures 5 and 6 there is evidence that
exposure to the random source has affected performance and that
the human-generated data are closer to the TU data (Figure 3B) in
the post conditions (in particular note that the AAAA and AAAB
bars for 0 occurrences are nearer to the values from the TU data in
Figure 3B in the post conditions).
Figure 8 shows the outcome of analysis 4 for the conditions in
Experiment 2. Similar to the data obtained in Experiment 1 these
boxplots emphasize the similarity in the median frequency for the
humans and TU data (Figure 4A). Based on Figure 4A, for an
agent paying attention to the median statistic it would be true to
say that subsequence AAAB is less likely to occur that AAAA and
this pattern of data emerges in the human generated sequences
also.
Tests for differences between conditions. A 2  2 mixed
ANOVA tested the RMSE correspondence between the generated
sequences and those expected under the Hahn and Warren (2009)
account. Between subjects we manipulated sound (silent, tones)
and within subjects we manipulated experience (pre, post). There
was a significant main effect of experience F(1, 70)  4.25, p 
.043, 2  0.06, but not of sound F(1, 70)  0.07, (p  .796).
These results indicate that the participants’ generated sequences
were better described by the Hahn and Warren account after
observing a genuine random sequence (Mean RMSE  0.23,
SD  0.08) than before (Mean RMSE  0.25, SD  0.08; Figure
9).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 are broadly in line with those of
Experiment 1 across Analyses 1–4. Replicating these findings
with a much bigger data set (Exp. 1: N  12 vs. Exp. 2: N  72)
rules out the possibility that the close correspondences observed in
Experiment 1 between human and TU data on the metrics consid-
ered were because of having used a small sample size. In addition
we have ruled out the possibility that our data were affected by the
way in which the exposure to a genuinely random source was
presented (i.e., purely based on visual vs. visual and auditory
information).
With respect to the issue of whether our participants were
simply mimicking sequences observed, we feel we can now argue
strongly against this point. By comparing the pre- and postexpo-
sure conditions we see that our participants produced behavior that
was indeed closer to that of a genuinely unbiased process after
having experience of outputs from such a source. However, given
that the properties of the specific experience observed are not well
matched to human performance (see Figure 10) we conclude that
participants have learned something general about random se-
quences rather than how to mimic a specific sequence.
A Simple Generative Model of Binary
Sequence Generation
What is it exactly that participants have learned? In this section
we outline a simple generative model with one free parameter that
closely approximates participant generated sequences. Inspired by
the Hahn and Warren (2009) account, this model is generative in
the sense that on each step a new binary digit is produced. The key
characteristics of the Hahn and Warren account relevant for this
model are: (a) that humans experience random events through a
sliding window of experience of length k and (b) that behavior is
largely driven by sensitivity to the difference between long runs
and the other sequences, that is, the majority of subsequences are
not distinguished by observers but perfect runs have a special
status, because of the large difference in occurrence rate observed
(see Figures 1B and 6) for TU sequences when n and k have
plausible values.
The model starts by randomly generating k-1 binary digits to
produce substring si-  [d1, d2, . . ., dk-1 ] where the di correspond
to binary digits. To generate the next digit, dk, the model considers
the possible length k subsequences that would result from the
possible digit selections. Of course, given a binary alphabet there
are only two such options, namely [si-, 0] or [si-, 1]. The model then
selects one of these options, either dk  0 or dk  1 with
probabilities p0 or p1 ( 1-p0) respectively, which results in the
first length k substring s1. To implement the sliding window, that
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Figure 5. Analysis 1 for k  4 in the four conditions of Experiment 2. Average subsequence frequencies
per 20-bit block are presented for both human-generated (dots) and the theoretically unbiased (TU) data
(solid line, 95% confidence interval [CI] dashed lines).
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Figure 6. Analysis 2 for k  4 in the four conditions of Experiment 2. Occurrence rates are presented for
both human-generated (dots) and theoretically unbiased (TU) data for length 20 sequences (solid lines, with
95% confidence interval [CI] as dashed lines).
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Figure 7. The results of Analysis 3 for sliding window length 4 for the four conditions in experiment 2.
Histograms describe the proportion of blocks containing each occurrence frequency for three selected
subsequences.
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is, characteristic (a) above, this process then repeats so that on step
i, si-  [di, di1, . . ., dik-1] and si is either [si-, 0] or [si-, 1]. We
propose a free parameter  that acts to “boost” or “de-boost” the
relative probability of one outcome, dk  0 or dk  1, over the
other on each step. For a genuinely random generation process  
0.5. However, to implement characteristic (b) we suggest that the
probability of an alternation after a run of the same outcome will
be boosted. Specifically, p1    0.5 for si-  [0, 0 . . ., 0] and
p0    0.5 for si-  [1, 1 . . ., 1].
We used the model to generate 100,000 20-bit sequences with a
plausible window of experience length of 4 (Cowan, 2001, 2010;
i.e., k  4), for values of the boost parameter  varying from 0.0
to 1.0 in steps of 0.05. Based on these model-generated sequences
we estimated the occurrence rate across repetitions for each length
4 subsequence and for each value of . We could then interpolate
the resultant look-up table to estimate the occurrence rate for each
subsequence as a function of . Using this interpolation scheme we
then fitted (using the MatLab fminsearch algorithm) human data
by adjusting the boost parameter for the complementary pair of
subsequences associated with stopping long runs (i.e., boosting p1
after 000 and p0 after 111).
The resultant fits are illustrated in Figure 11 and the associ-
ated residual errors across generated subsequences are illus-
trated in Figure 12. Note first that the fits are generally quite
good but appear considerably better, with smaller residuals, in
the postexposure conditions, suggesting that some learning has
taken place. Furthermore, note that the fitted value of  is
higher in the both pre-exposure generation conditions ( 
0.76, with tones;   0.77, without tones) than the postexpo-
sure generation conditions (  0.63, with tones;   0.61,
without tones). This result suggests that postexposure partici-
pant generated sequences are closer to what would be expected
from a genuinely random source.
In Tables 1 and 2 we summarize the results of fitting a range of
other models with one free parameter but in which we boosted one
of the other seven different pairs of complementary subsequences.
Note that (e.g.) boosting the pair 0001 and 1110 (  0.5) is
equivalent to de-boosting ( 	 0.5) the pair (0000 and 1111) so the
values of  for these cases sum to 1 (see Table 1) and the residual
errors are very similar (see Table 2).
Note in Table 2 that the best fits (lowest average residual error)
to the human data are obtained by boosting 0001 and 1000 (al-
though boosting 1001 and 0110, which both break a run of length
3 is almost as good). Consequently we propose that, consistent
with the key characteristic of the Hahn and Warren account raised
above, the best fits to human data are obtained when runs are
treated differently from other subsequences.
Figure 8. Analysis 4 for k  4 in the four conditions of Experiment 2. Boxplots illustrate medians,
Inter-Quartile Range (IQRs), and extreme values of the data for the three sequences types AAAA, AAAB, and
ABAB.
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General Discussion
Summary
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the theoret-
ical account of randomness perception put forward by Hahn and
Warren (2009). In particular we wanted to go beyond the standard
account that presents a picture of randomness perception as highly
biased because the frequencies of human-generated subsequences
depart from those expected from a truly random process (Figure
1A). While we do not deny that human behavior does not corre-
spond perfectly with the sequences generated by a genuinely
random source we suggest that the extent of this departure depends
to a large part on the metrics chosen to compare behavior. We
present a set of alternative analyses of our data across two exper-
iments and for which human performance is remarkably similar to
that of a random process. Furthermore we suggest that the metrics
which arise provide a more appropriate means for comparison in
taking into account the nature of human experience. We go on to
develop a simple model with one free parameter, which imple-
ments key characteristics of the Hahn and Warren (2009) account
and that generates sequences that match the properties of human
generated sequences.
Mimicry or Genuine Sensitivity to More General
Properties of Experienced Random Sequences?
One potential reply to this study might be that it probes (and
evaluates) “mimicry”, rather than people’s conception of randomness
(on the contrast between conceptions and perceptions of randomness
see also, Zhao, Hahn, & Osherson, 2014). Here, it is worth bearing in
mind that the majority of studies on random sequence generation have
instructed participants to “imagine an unbiased coin” and “generate
sequences like it” or “representative” of it (e.g., Kareev, 1992; Nick-
erson & Butler, 2009; see also Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991 for an
overview). There is good reason for this in that research on intuitive
statistics, to which randomness research has always belonged (see,
e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), is not concerned with people’s
metalevel explications of statistical concepts (that would amount, in
effect, to probing their mathematical knowledge), but rather with
intuitive statistical notions implicit in behavior. In the case of ran-
domness, such an intuitive understanding must necessarily derive
from experience, and it is the point of recent theoretical accounts such
as that of Hahn and Warren (2009) and the empirical work described
here to make clear just how much observed behavior may actually
resemble people’s experience. Nevertheless, our study does intention-
ally depart from other sequence generation studies in the past by
providing participants with experience of a model random process.
However, a simple analysis (see Figure 10), shows that the
participant-generated sequences obtained in Experiment 2 were con-
siderably less well correlated with the specific observed sequence than
generic sequences generated by a truly random process. This result
suggests that any experiential learning that did take place was unlikely
to be simple mimicry. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we probed
participant behavior both before and after exposure to experience so
we could assess the extent to which perception was affected. Indeed
there was a clear effect of seeing output from a “machine generating
a random sequence” that was viewed passively without any need to
engage with the sequence (e.g., through outcome prediction as in
Edwards, 1961): After exposure, participant-generated sequences
were significantly closer to those generated by the random source.
Taken together these results suggest that although recent experience
does play a role in shaping current perception of randomness, as
reflected in a generation task, these effects are not based on the ability
to both acquire and reflect faithfully the distributional characteristics
of the specific sample sequence seen in the lab. Instead we suggest
that even from the relatively short, passive exposure, participants were
genuinely sensitive to more general properties of random sequences
that were then reflected in their outputs. Based on this result we
suggest both that experience of randomness is key to subsequent
perception, and that, consequently, the much-bemoaned “biases” in
randomness perception and generation are ultimately transient phe-
nomena.
Metrics to Assess Bias in Randomness Perception
A key result of this article is that the correspondence between
human and unbiased theoretical data depends on the statistics used to
parameterize performance (and this holds regardless of whether the
human data has substantially been altered by the experiment itself).
We have presented several analyses that emphasize the similarities.
Moreover, these analyses are appropriate in that they reflect the
manner in which we are likely to experience random events because
of the constraints imposed on human cognition—that is, as a sliding
window moving one outcome at a time through a longer but finite
sequence of unfolding events. The results presented confirm the
argument made in Hahn and Warren (2010) that the mean (expected
value) is not an appropriate statistic to characterize the distribution of
subsequences generated by either a human or unbiased process under
a sliding window analysis. The level of skew in the data is high and
it is precisely for such distributions that the median and/or mode are
preferable. As noted in Hahn and Warren (2010), it would seem
problematic to conclude that average income was $100,000 per month
in a population where most made $1,000 and very few made
0.0
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Figure 9. Mean root mean square error of approximation (RMSE) be-
tween Hahn and Warren account and participants’ generated sequences in
each of the conditions. There was no significant effect of sound, but there
was a significant reduction in RMSE after participants had observed a
genuine random sequence. Error bars represent 
1 SEM.
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$1,000,000. By the same logic, based on the distributions presented in
Figure 2, it is not sensible to suggest that one would expect to see (on
average) about one instance of HHHH in 20 coin flips. In contrast the
median (Figures 4 and 8) and or/mode (Figures 3 and 9) statistics are
more meaningful, and, based on these statistics humans look rather
well matched to the genuinely unbiased process.
Cognitive Constraints
The fact that human and unbiased sequence generation processes
share common features for Analysis 2 (at a range of plausible window
lengths; see supplementary materials) suggests that it is possible that
on average our participants were behaving similarly to the process
Figure 10. Human occurrence rate data (circles) in the pre- and postexperience conditions (averaged over the silent and
tones conditions) observed in the four conditions of Experiment 2. In the top row we also show the occurrence rates that
might be expected if the observer were trying to mimic the actual sequence observed (solid line). In the bottom row we also
show the occurrence rates based on the Hahn and Warren (2009) account (solid line). Clearly the participant data is closest
to the Hahn and Warren account occurrence rates and this is particularly true in the postexperience data. Postexperience and
HW09 RMSE  0.05. Postexperience and stimuli RMSE  0.09 (RMSE  root mean square error).
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described in Hahn and Warren (2009) with sliding window length
around 4. In practice, individuals are likely to have different and
possibly nonstationary sliding window lengths. If enough data is
generated, it may be possible to establish a link between individual
sequence statistics and a proxy measure of window length such as
digit-span or STM capacity. An investigation of this possibility will
form the basis of future work.
A Generative Model of Human Random
Sequence Generation
In Section 4 we presented a very simple generative model of how
humans might produce random sequences. Nonetheless, this model
provides a good description of observed human generation data (see
Figure 10) and this is particularly the case for data generated postex-
posure to the genuinely random source (see Figure 10). Better fits to
the data could, of course, be obtained by boosting multiple subse-
quences or boosting subsequences at multiple lengths. We have cho-
sen not to do this, in part because it would be difficult to choose
between such models without extensive data. In addition, the fact that
a model that departs rather subtly from a genuinely random generation
process captures human behavior so well emphasizes the extent to
which characterizing human performance as flawed is potentially
unjustified. This is especially true given the way in which the model
departs from an unbiased process (i.e., by boosting runs) actually
reflects a genuine statistical feature of such sequences under a com-
pelling model of how humans might actually experience an unfolding
sequence of random events.
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Figure 11. Occurrence rate data (circles) and fits (lines) based on boosting 0001 and 1110 across the four
experimental conditions.
Figure 12. Residual errors from fits shown in Figure 11 when boosting
AAAB (0001 and 1110) subsequences. Note that errors are markedly
reduced in the postexperience conditions.
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Generation Tasks Versus Other Randomness
Perception Tasks
In the beginning of the article we noted that other tasks (i.e.,
not involving sequence generation) have been used previously
to investigate randomness perception. In first instance, then, our
findings are limited to the context of sequence generation.
However, sequence generation has been by far the most com-
mon task used in this literature and there is evidence that
performance in another commonly used task (random sequence
judgment; e.g., see Falk & Konold, 1997) is compatible with
that in generation tasks (e.g., see Farmer, Warren, & Hahn,
2017). Also, other tasks such as the ingenious (although more
indirect) memory-based studies used by Olivola and Oppen-
heimer (2008) are arguably reliant on the fact that biases in
perception have been observed previously in more direct tasks
such as sequence generation and judgment. Consequently, the
limitation to sequence generation is arguably less restrictive
than it might first seem. More important, however, the specific
task used is secondary to the major thrust of this article, which
is aimed at the question of suitable metrics for assessing these
bias phenomena in the first place, an issue that is orthogonal to
that of the method used to observe such effects.
So, Is Randomness Perception Biased?
No evidence we present in the present manuscript can argue
against the clear departures of human behavior from that which
might be expected from an idealized information processing
system. Under that definition, then, it is clearly the case that
human randomness perception is biased. It is also the case (as
noted above) that such departures can have important implica-
tions (e.g., see Toneatto et al., 1997). However, our contention,
both in Hahn and Warren (2009) and the present study, is that
this bias is a natural consequence of the cognitive constraints
identified and actually reflects an entirely appropriate tuning for
the statistics of the environment as experienced under those
constraints. In that sense, then, it seems problematic to char-
acterize this behavior merely as a failing.
This point seems all the more important because given
enough resolution, deviations between actual human and ideal-
ized, optimal performance seem inevitable (e.g., see Jarvstad,
Hahn, Rushton, & Warren, 2013). This makes it more fruitful to
investigate why specific deviations are observed. It is worth
noting here a distinction between the Judgment and Decision
Making (JDM) and Vision Science literatures. Visual illusions
are not generally referred to as perceptual biases. Papers pub-
lished in that literature do not generally start out with an
emphasis on, and description of, how biased the system is.
Rather, illusions are more likely to be discussed as unavoidable
side effects of the constraints operating on the system and
treated as an opportunity to identify those constraints to explain
the behavior. This was once a widely held view in the cognitive
literature also; indeed, much of Tversky and Kahneman’s orig-
inal work on “heuristics and biases” explicitly drew out the
methodological parallel to the study of perceptual illusions
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, subsequent decades
have arguably witnessed more negative framing of such devi-
ations, and an increased emphasis on bias as an indicator of
human cognitive frailty (for a historical overview of bias and its
role in psychological research see Hahn & Harris, 2014).
We think the present results illustrate why a return to the
perspective of Vision Science would be fruitful when it comes
to considering randomness perception. Indeed recent results
indicate the importance of not overemphasizing cognitive bias
in the JDM literature more generally. A number of recent
studies have suggested that when appropriate cognitive con-
straints are taken into account, and participants engage in
well-defined tasks, their behavior is close to optimal (Howes,
Warren, Farmer, El-Deredy, & Lewis, 2016; Jarvstad et al.,
2013; Jarvstad, Rushton, Warren, & Hahn, 2012; Maloney,
Trommershauser, & Landy, 2007; Warren, Graf, Champion, &
Maloney, 2012). Furthermore, recent reappraisals of what, on
Table 1
Boost Parameters Obtained by Fitting Procedure
Condition
0000
1111
0001
1110
0010
1101
0011
1100
0100
1011
0101
1010
0110
1001
0111
1000
(pre, silent) .2277 .7723 .5833 .4167 .3529 .6475 .6632 .3368
(post, silent) .3893 .6101 .5038 .4957 .5000 .4984 .5287 .4706
(pre, tone) .2383 .7617 .5663 .4339 .3958 .6033 .6170 .3830
(post, tone) .3652 .6347 .5267 .4714 .4577 .5459 .5362 .4622
Table 2
Residual Errors Obtained by Fitting Procedure
Condition
0000
1111
0001
1110
0010
1101
0011
1100
0100
1011
0101
1010
0110
1001
0111
1000
(pre, silent) .1113 .1113 .1748 .1749 .1405 .1405 .0760 .0760
(post, silent) .0174 .0174 .0356 .0347 .0362 .0364 .0318 .0318
(pre, tone) .0454 .0454 .1191 .1190 .1120 .1120 .0637 .0638
(post, tone) .0130 .0130 .0318 .0321 .0322 .0323 .0289 .0290
Average .0468 .0468 .0903 .0901 .0803 .0803 .0501 .0501
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first inspection, appears as irrefutable evidence of cognitive
bias in JDM have shown that such behavior might actually be
rational when information processing is corrupted by noise
(Costello & Watts, 2014; Howes et al., 2016).
Conclusion
We provide experimental data that is consistent with the
account put forward by Hahn and Warren (2009, 2010). Based
on the experimental and theoretical work presented here, to-
gether with recent related work testing predictions of the Hahn
and Warren (2009) account for both random sequence genera-
tion and judgment (Farmer et al., 2017), we suggest that appar-
ent biases in human randomness perception should be reevalu-
ated. In particular we suggest that it is problematic to suggest
human behavior is flawed simply because it departs from that of
an unbiased process on metrics that may not reflect cognitive
and task constraints.
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